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United States Foreign Policy Objectives 
 
 
Drew WatkinsI 
 
 
“In our system, the truth behind those facts deserves to be presented in a 
court—a court of law where fairness and justice will be assured. This measure does 
not prejudge a verdict or issue a judgment. It gives both sides a fair day in court.”2 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) was enacted to allow 
the families of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks to sue the Saudi 
Arabian government for its alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks.1 It was passed 
by Congress on September 28, 2016, with overwhelming bipartisan support.2 
President Obama had previously vetoed the legislation, on September 23, 2016, 
after it passed through both houses without a single dissenting vote, but Congress 
acted quickly to override his veto by a vote of 97–1 in the Senate and 348–77 in the 
House of Representatives.3 While many argued against the passage of JASTA, the 
families of 9/11 victims who lost loved ones on September 11, 2001, lobbied 
Congress and President Obama to pass this legislation and send a clear message to 
the world: “If you support a terrorist attack against U.S. citizens in the United 
States of America, we will hold you accountable in a U.S. court.”4 
The passage of this Act was viewed as an attempt to bring justice to the families 
of 9/11 victims and hold the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia accountable for its potential 
involvement in the terrorist activities of that day.5 However, the scope of JASTA 
was never limited to the September 11th attacks, and, as a result, it has much 
broader implications for sovereign immunity as a whole.6 The protections afforded 
by sovereign immunity are far reaching and complex. It is under this protection 
that our military service men and women can act around the globe without fear of 
litigation for the actions they take at the request of our government. It is also the 
concept of sovereign immunity, however, that has shielded other state actors from 
liability for their involvement in terrorist acts carried out on United States soil.7 
Since 1976, the United States has adhered to the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, which allows states to create limited exceptions to the immunity 
afforded to sovereigns.8 Supporters of JASTA argue that this act simply continues 
1 See generally Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 2, 130 Stat. 852 
(2016). 
2 Seung Min Kim, Congress Hands Obama First Veto Override, POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2016,  
1:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/senate-jasta-228841 [https://perma.cc/6MHW-
S5GY]. 
3 Id.; Seung Min Kim, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill, Politico (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-jasta-228548 [https://perma.cc/FDC2-E36V]. 
4 Message from 9/11 Committee, PASSJASTA.ORG, http://passjasta.org/message-from-911-
committee/ [https://perma.cc/3X7S-8LUQ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).  
5 Message from 9/11 Committee, supra note 4; see also Terry Strada et al., 9/11 Families Pen 
Letter Urging Obama to OK Anti-Terrorism Bill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/9-11-families-pen-letter-urging-obama-anti-terrorism-bill-
article-1.2787663 [https://perma.cc/KZE7-CR7X]. 
6 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 7, 130 Stat. 852, 855 (2016). 
7 See, e.g., James Risen, Terrorist Claims Return Sept. 11 Suit to Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jBnmur [https://perma.cc/VAC5-GF9R]. 
8 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)). 
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that tradition by creating another limited immunity exception.9 JASTA critics 
argue, however, that this exception can be used by other states to justify similar 
legislation which would allow them to sue the United States and its men and 
women operating abroad.10 It was primarily this concern that led President Obama 
to veto the legislation.11 Despite these concerns, Congress chose to override the 
Presidential veto and pass JASTA into law. 
Principles of sovereign immunity have stood as a cornerstone of international 
law and intergovernmental relations for hundreds of years. There are serious 
concerns to be weighed and evaluated when looking at legislation that seeks to 
waive or alter this fundamental tenant of global relations. While the United States 
Congress almost certainly abdicated its responsibility for weighing these concerns 
when it passed JASTA,12 these concerns must continue to be evaluated and 
considered for any new legislation that may impact sovereign immunity. Congress 
has a duty to protect our national security interests and to take immediate steps to 
minimize any international response to the passage of JASTA.  
Part I of this Note discusses the history of sovereign immunity in the United 
States and the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which 
codifies limited exceptions to the sovereign immunities doctrine under United 
States law. Part II discusses the background of terrorism legislation in this country 
and what led to the passage of JASTA. Part III addresses the unintended 
consequences of this legislation and looks at arguments from both sides of the 
debate to determine whether JASTA is good policy. Part IV argues that even if the 
underlying policy of JASTA is laudable ⎯ to hold terrorists accountable for their 
action on United States soil ⎯ its methods for achieving this goal will be largely 
ineffective. Lastly, Part V discusses how the United States should advance 
sovereign immunity principles now that JASTA has been signed into law, 
including options for fixing JASTA, stopping the erosion of sovereign immunity 
around the world, and other ways to effectively bring the perpetrators of terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil to justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 See Lee Whitesell, JASTA Not as Bad as It Seems, NEW JURIST (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://newjurist.com/jasta-not-as-bad-as-it-seems.html [https://perma.cc/B9N9-WUBP].  
10 162 CONG. REC. S6171–72 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016) (letter from Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) 
 et al. to Senators Cornyn and Schumer). 
11 See 162 CONG. REC. S6071–72 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2016) (President Obama’s veto message 
regarding JASTA). 
12 See 162 CONG. REC. S6071–72; see also 162 CONG. REC. S6171–72 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016) 
(“[C]oncerns have been raised regarding potential unintended consequences that may result from 
[JASTA] for the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”). 
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I.  HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
The concept of sovereign immunity traces back to English common law.13 
Based on the idea that “the king can do no wrong,” sovereign immunity developed 
as a judicial doctrine that limited the king’s exposure to suit.14 In the broadest 
sense, sovereign immunity provides a government with protection from being sued 
without its consent.15 Troy Daniels explains, “Historically, foreign states enjoyed 
absolute sovereign immunity under ‘traditional precepts of international law.’”16 
“Absolute sovereign immunity is based on the long recognized concept ‘that each 
domestic sovereign waives its judicial power over foreign sovereigns in the interest 
of compelling intercourse among them . . . .’”17 In the United States, the Supreme 
Court has recognized sovereign immunity as an important international legal 
principle since the early 1800s.18 As Justice Marshall declared, a “common interest 
impelling [sovereign states] to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good 
offices with each other,” requires the application of sovereign immunity.19 
Eventually, the doctrine of sovereign immunity adapted from an absolute 
immunity to a restrictive immunity that recognized a few exceptions for 
commercial activities.20 This has been the prevailing international view for several 
decades, as noted recently by the International Court of Justice.21 In 1976, 
Congress codified this principle of international law through the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).22 These principles have served the United States well. Due 
to the shear breadth of our global commitments around the world, the sovereign 
immunity doctrine serves to protect U.S. property that could otherwise be subject 
to foreign judgments.23 Likewise, principles of sovereign immunity shield U.S. 
agents, service members, diplomats, and other assets from liability for actions 
which foreign actors may not like and may consider illegal.24 It is easy to see that 
13 John B. Ostrow & Joseph H. Lowe, Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1297, 1299 
(1979). 
14 Troy Daniels, An Analysis of the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 DET. C. L. 
J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 175, 176 (1995). 
15 Sovereign Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
16 Daniels, supra note 16, at 176. 
17 Id. 
18 Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 116–17, 135–37 (1812). 
19 Id. at 137. 
20 Daniels, supra note 16, at 175.  
21 Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 59–61 (Feb. 3) 
(discussing the scope of sovereign immunity), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/143/143-
20120203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/98X4-6QHT]. 
22 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611). 
23 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 2040 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of 
Paul B. Stephan, Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School). 
24 See id.  
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there is no bigger beneficiary to the principles of sovereign immunity than the 
United States.25 
 
II.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TERRORISM LITIGATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
A.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
 
Pamela Sue Malkin explains, “In 1976, the United States adopted the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which altered American law from the theory of 
absolute sovereign immunity to the restrictive concept of sovereign immunity.”26 
The FSIA represents a “codification of international law,” and provides for a 
number of exceptions to immunity “recognized by international practice.”27 “Under 
the FSIA, foreign sovereigns are immune from suit for their actions, unless one of 
the specific, enumerated exceptions to immunity applies.”28 
The FSIA was “[e]nacted in response to increased foreign governmental 
involvement in the [global] marketplace.”29 This legislation gave U.S. federal courts 
the authority to hear cases involving foreign governments when they “engage[d] in 
‘commercial activity’ which has a direct effect in the United States.” 30 The FSIA 
was never intended to violate international law or customs. On the contrary, 
President Gerald Ford made clear after signing the FSIA into law that it 
“continues the long-standing commitment of the United States to seek a stable 
international order under the law.”31  
In 1996, the FSIA was amended to permit litigation for acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by countries designated as “state sponsor[s] of terrorism.”32 In order to 
minimize any reciprocal effects of such an amendment, it was written narrowly to 
limit its application to countries the Secretary of State determines to have 
25 See id. 
26 Pamela Sue Malkin, Case Comment, Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 
(11th Cir. 1986), 11 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 251, 251 (1987). 
27 Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199–200 
(2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012 & Supp. III 2016). 
28 Felice A. Glennon, Case Comment, Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 
1018 (9th Cir. 1987), 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 703, 703 (1989). Most notably, the exceptions to 
sovereign immunity enumerated in the FSIA cover commercial activities and activities which result in 
money damages and occur entirely within the United States, the so called “territorial tort” exception. See 
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012). 
29 Daniels, supra note 14, at 175. 
30 Id.  
31 Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,  
(October 22, 1976), Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6506  [https://perma.cc/K8VH-36D9] (last visited Oct. 14, 
2017). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996) (repealed 2008 and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012)); see 
also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES 
BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 1 (2008). 
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“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”33 But even this 
narrowly tailored amendment does not comport with generally accepted 
international law.34 As a result, other governments have labeled the United States a 
sponsor of terrorism, making U.S. agents and agencies operating abroad potential 
targets for foreign litigation.35 
The threat of foreign litigation, as a result of reciprocal erosions of sovereign 
immunity, is not simply theoretical. At least two countries have passed legislation 
to remove U.S. sovereign immunity in their courts in response to legislation 
enacted by the United States.36 Cuba has allowed suits to be brought against the 
United States for human rights violations, which has resulted in billions of dollars 
in damages against the United States.37 Iran has also allowed lawsuits to proceed 
against the United States for what Iran perceives to be terrorist activities.38 In fact, 
one Iranian businessman who received a half a billion dollar judgment against the 
United States reportedly tried to attach the vacant U.S. embassy in Tehran to 
satisfy his judgment.39 
Additionally, several suits have been brought against U.S. officials in Europe 
over the last decade for their roles in fighting terrorism. In 2009, for example, 
several American CIA and State Department officials were convicted in absentia by 
33 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012). The countries that are designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism 
change periodically. Currently, this list includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. State Sponsors of Terrorism, 
U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [https://perma.cc/FWU5-7L2Q] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2017). North Korea was added back to the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on 
November 20, 2017 after being removed in 2008. Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Trump 
Returns North Korea to List of State Sponsors of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/politics/north-korea-trump-terror.html. Cuba was removed 
from the list most recently, in 2015.Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. Removes Cuba from State-Sponsored 
Terrorism List, N.Y. TIMES  
(May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/us/us-removes-cuba-from-state-terrorism-
list.html [https://perma.cc/66FH-YULW]. 
34 See Evaluating the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2930 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8–9 (2010) (statement of 
John B. Bellinger III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP). 
35 Id. 
36 ELSEA, supra note 32, at 56.  
37 Id. 
38 Id.; see also Michael Theodoulou, Tehran Court Rules Against US, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Feb. 3, 2003), https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0203/p06s01-wome.html [https://perma.cc/VCT5-
9G3R]. 
39 Mike Theodoulou, Iran Court to Strip U.S. of Embassy?, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006, 
 8:48 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/iran-court-to-strip-us-of-embassy/ 
[https://perma.cc/6E45-PWSV]. The United States argued that, “under the Vienna Convention, 
diplomatic premises,” including its embassy in Tehran, were “immune from court judgments.” Id. But, 
the Iranian businessman who obtained the judgment countered that the U.S. lost that international 
protection when it adopted the 1996 amendment to the FSIA, which allows lawsuits in U.S. courts 
against designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, including Iran. Id. An Iranian official denied that the 
U.S. embassy had been seized, noting that the judicial sale of embassy property is a violation of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ELSEA, supra note 32, at 66–67, 67 n. 252. This charade 
illustrates that these judgements are largely symbolic and reinforces the ineffective nature of 
international litigation to resolve disputes against sovereigns. 
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an Italian court in connection with the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.40 
Although none of these officials have served time for their convictions, having all 
fled the country before the sentences were handed down,41 these cases cause great 
concern for American men and women working overseas who worry their actions 
may not be afforded full diplomatic protection. 
 The threat of foreign litigation has become so pervasive that the Department 
of Justice has an entire division responsible for “protect[ing] U.S. interests in all 
litigation pending in foreign courts.”42 According to the Office of Foreign 
Litigation, most of the cases it handles “are defensive” and “reflect the wide range 
of the U.S. Government’s international activities.”43 Many of its cases relate to 
defending actions that arise from United States agency or military activity in 
foreign countries.44  The Office of Foreign Litigation estimates that at any given 
time its lawyers are representing the United States in around 1,000 lawsuits in over 
100 countries.45 If the United States continues to invite foreign suits through 
additional waivers of sovereign immunity, the amount of foreign litigation to which 
the United States is a party can be expected to grow exponentially. 
 
B.  In re Terrorist Attacks Litigation 
 
For the last decade, families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have 
attempted to bring suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its alleged 
involvement in those attacks. In 2005, a pair of federal district court rulings 
dismissed claims against the Saudi government relying on the “discretionary 
function” clause of the FSIA.46 Although the FSIA provides an exception to 
40 See Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 23 Americans for C.I.A. Renditions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/world/europe/05italy.html [https://perma.cc/X4FP-
FD83]. 
41 Ian Shapira, Ex-CIA Officer Jailed in Portugal for Her Alleged Role in Kidnapping a Terrorism 
Suspect, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ex-cia-officer-jailed-in-
portugal-for-her-alleged-role-in-kidnapping-a-terrorism-suspect/2017/02/22/b3fcf94a-f906-11e6-
9845-576c69081518_story.html?utm_term=.b2be4ca33422 [https://perma.cc/PKD4-HDYG]. 
Although those who were convicted have not served any time on their sentences, Sabrina de Sousa, who 
worked for the CIA at the time, spent ten days in a Portuguese prison after traveling to Portugal in 
2015. Andrei Khalip & Jonathan Landay, Ex-CIA Spy Freed in Portugal, Avoids Extradition over 
Kidnapping, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-us-cia-pardon-
idUSKBN1683ZC [https://perma.cc/KXS2-UHX6]. In addition to the stigma that these convictions 
have created for the men and women who were serving their country, the convictions have also 
prevented them from traveling abroad, fearful that they may be apprehended and extradited to Italy. See 
id. 
42 See Office of Foreign Litigation, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-foreign-
litigation [https://perma.cc/DAT5-KGVX] (last updated Aug. 1, 2017). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 801–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
[hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks I]; In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 
539, 553–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks II]. 
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sovereign immunity when damage from tortious conduct occurs in the United 
States, the “discretionary function” clause disallows such suits when the tort results 
from discretionary conduct on the part of the foreign sovereign.47 The district 
courts concluded that any action taken by Saudi Arabia, including any financial 
payments made to entities linked to terrorism, constituted discretionary functions.48 
The Second Circuit affirmed these decisions, but on different grounds.49 The 
Court of Appeals held that the 1996 Amendment to the FSIA, allowing suits 
against state sponsors of terrorism, was the sole means for bringing a terrorism 
related action.50 Because Saudi Arabia was never designated a “State Sponsor of 
Terrorism,” they could not be sued for terrorism-related claims under any of the 
other FSIA exceptions to immunity.51 The plaintiffs sought certiorari, and the 
United States Supreme Court called on then Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, to 
offer her views on the matter.52 It was the opinion of the Solicitor General that 
certiorari be denied  
because—although a foreign sovereign who was not designated as a State Sponsor 
of Terrorism could be sued for terrorism-related tortious conduct that resulted in 
injury in the United States—such suit could only be sustained under the FSIA 
when the entire tort took place “within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”53 As the government argued, even if the allegations against Saudi Arabia 
are true, much of the alleged tortious conduct occurred overseas, and therefore, 
would not fall under the FSIA exception for tortious conduct.54 The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.55  
While this would have been the end of the Terrorist Attacks litigation, the 
Second Circuit revived the matter in Doe v. Bin Laden by rendering a holding 
inconsistent with that reached in In re Terrorist Attacks III.56 In Doe, the Court of 
Appeals held that the tortious conduct and State Sponsor of Terrorism exceptions 
under the FSIA provided independent grounds to hold foreign sovereigns liable in 
47 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012) (allowing suits against foreign sovereigns when the 
tortious conduct results in damage in the U.S.), with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (containing the 
“discretionary function” clause, disallowing such suits where the actions constitute a “discretionary 
function regardless of whether the discretion be abused”). 
48 In re Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 803–04; In re Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d 
at 555–56. 
49 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83, 86–90 (2d Cir. 2008). 
[hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks III]. 
50 Id. at 87–89. 
51 Id. at 89–90. 
52 See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Fed. Ins. Co. v. Saudi Arabia (2009) 
 (No. 08–640). 
53 Id. at 1–3, 11–13.  
54 Id. at 13–14. 
55  In re Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 935 (2009).   
56 Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 70–71, 70 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We recognize that this holding 
is inconsistent with that reached by . . . our Court in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, 
F.3d 71, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) . . . .”). 
                                                       KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                    Vol. I06 154
United States courts.57 Following this ruling, the plaintiffs in the Terrorist Attacks 
litigation filed a motion for relief from the judgment that was subsequently granted 
in December 2013, and the case was remanded to district court for additional 
proceedings.58 Finally, in September 2015, the district court once more dismissed 
the litigation because, as the Solicitor General argued in her brief, the tortious 
conduct did not take place entirely within the territorial United States.59 
 
C.  The Anti-Terrorism Act 
 
A parallel issue in the arena of terrorism litigation arises under the  
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which allows United States nationals to obtain treble 
damages against those responsible for injuries that arise out of “an act of 
international terrorism.”60 Pertaining to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the ATA does not make clear if it allows for theories of secondary liability such as 
aiding and abetting.61 Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that claims 
based on secondary liability are excluded under the ATA.62 
Although most of the recent terrorism related litigation has been focused on the 
FSIA, some 9/11 families have made efforts to hold individuals accountable under 
the ATA.63 These court decisions, combined with the realities of the 9/11 attacks, 
prevented justice from being served in the eyes of the families engaged in these 
litigation battles.64 It is against this backdrop of complex and strenuous sovereign 
immunities litigation that Congress sought to address what many perceived was a 
loophole in the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 Doe, 663 F.3d at 70 (“[T]he terrorism exception, rather than limiting the jurisdiction conferred 
by the noncommercial tort exception, provides an additional basis for jurisdiction.”). 
58 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353, 355–56, 359 (2d Cir. 2013). 
59 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 134 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); 
see also supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.  
60 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
61 Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In the ATA, § 2333 is silent as to 
the permissibility of aiding and abetting liability.”). 
62 See, e.g., id. at 97–98; Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685,  
93 (7th Cir. 2008). 
63 See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.  
64 See infra note 96–98 and accompanying text. 
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III.  JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ACT (JASTA) 
 
A.  Background and Enactment 
 
In 2016, Congress enacted JASTA:  
 
[T]o provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, . . .  to seek 
relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries, wherever acting 
and wherever they may be found, that have provided material support, 
directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that engage in 
terrorist activities against the United States.65  
 
In enacting this legislation, Congress directed the statute at: 
 
Persons, entities, or countries that knowingly or recklessly contribute 
material support or resources, directly or indirectly, to persons or 
organizations that pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism 
that threaten the security of nationals of the United States or the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, 
necessarily direct their conduct at the United States, and should 
reasonably anticipate being brought to court in the United States to 
answer for such activities.66 
 
The passage of this bi-partisan bill was in response to the Terrorism Attack 
decisions discussed earlier in this Note and a direct result of a long and harrowing 
fight by the families of the victims of 9/11 to hold the government of Saudi Arabia 
accountable for their alleged involvement.67 In an open letter to President Obama 
encouraging him to sign JASTA into law, 9/11 families wrote:  
 
We and so many other families have fought for years to know all of the 
truth about 9/11. We have fought to ensure that anyone and any entity 
that may have had a responsible role in the murder of 3,000 people in 
New York, at the Pentagon and across a field in Pennsylvania is held to 
account for their actions.68  
 
However, President Obama, citing numerous national security concerns, would 
not sign JASTA into law.69 Congress acted swiftly and, in a  
65 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 
(2016). 
66 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 2(a)(6). 
67 See supra Section II.B. 
68 Strada et al., supra note 5.  
69 Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040 to the Senate of the United States, 
Office of the Press Sec’y (Sept. 23, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040 [https://perma.cc/LX9X-ULVN]. 
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bi-partisan vote, overrode the presidential veto, delivering the first and only veto 
override of President Obama’s tenure.70  
The White House called the override “the single most embarrassing thing the 
United States Senate has done possibly since 1983.”71 Senator Chuck Schumer (D-
N.Y.), a chief sponsor of the bill, responded that “[o]verriding a presidential veto is 
something we don’t take lightly, but it was important in this case that the families 
of the victims of 9/11 be allowed to pursue justice, even if that pursuit causes some 
diplomatic discomforts.”72 Despite this unprecedented action, it was quickly 
apparent that several Senators who had voted to override President Obama’s veto 
held serious reservations about the potential “unintended consequences” of the 
legislation.73 
From the beginning, JASTA was viewed as focusing primarily on the alleged 
involvement of Saudi Arabia in the terrorist attacks of September 11.74 However, 
the legislation was not drafted to apply specifically to those events or actors.75 
While some supporters, like Senator John Cornyn  
(R-TX), believed the bill was “narrowly tailored” to deter any reciprocal 
legislation,76 that opinion was not shared by many national security advisors and 
70 Congress Rejects Obama Veto of 9/11 Bill, in First Override of Presidency, FOX NEWS  
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/09/29/congress-rejects-obama-veto-911-bill-
in-first-override-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/2SJW-Z2CD]. 
71 Kim, supra note 2. The White House’s statement was in response to reports that the veto 
override vote for JASTA (97–1 in the Senate) was the most overwhelming since Congress voted to 
override President Ronal Reagan in 1983 with a vote of 95–0. Jordan Fabian, White House Lashes Out 
at ‘Embarrassing’ Senate Veto Override, HILL (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://origin-
nyi.thehill.com/homenews/administration/298290-white-house-lashes-out-at-embarrassing-senate-veto 
[https://perma.cc/HVN8-ND26]. The vote in 1983 overrode President Reagan’s veto of a bill that gave 
a few acres of land to six retired couples who learned a surveying error resulted in them paying for land 
that was technically still government property. Dale Russakoff, Elderly Oregonians Win Battle on Hill, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/26/elderly-
oregonians-win-battle-on-hill/c2eeb909-ec05-4532-886b-dbca63ec407a/?utm_term=.b9e57c1bfb5d 
[https://perma.cc/JD2S-YMVC]. 
Dale Russakoff, Reagan Veto Criticized as an Insensitive Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 1983), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/22/reagan-veto-criticized-as-an-insensitive-
act/94ae51d3-724e-4e44-89ff-a3a5c5d56e44/?utm_term=.3c1fbc0b8914 [https://perma.cc/MN4W-
RLQZ]. The 1983 bill seems hardly comparable to this monumental legislation that strips sovereign 
immunity protections from foreign nations. 
72 Richard Lardner, Congress Rebukes Obama, Overrides Veto of 9/11 Legislation, KSL.COM 
(Sept. 28, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.ksl.com/index.php?sid=41649553&nid=481 
[https://perma.cc/6USA-C9L2]. 
73 See, e.g., Letter from 28 Senators, on anticipated override of President Obama’s veto of S.2040, 
to Senators Cornyn and Schumer (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d8eee900-5ffc-4204-a4f1-
8072c104d9c2/Bipartisan%20Senate%20JASTA%20Letter%20092816.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z46-
4JQN] (noting that “concerns have been raised regarding potential unintended consequences that may 
result from [JASTA] for the national security and foreign policy of the United States”). 
74 See Kim, supra note 2. 
75 See generally Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852 
(2016). 
76 See Lardner, supra note 72. 
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foreign policy experts.77 These national security concerns formed the basis for 
President Obama’s veto of the proposed legislation. 
 
B.  A History of JASTA and What It Actually Does 
 
Before analyzing the arguments against JASTA and concerns about unintended 
consequences of JASTA, it is necessary to consider the history of JASTA 
legislation and discuss the actual implications of the legislation. Draft versions of 
JASTA had been circulating in the Senate for several years, but it was not until it 
became apparent that the families of the 9/11 victims would not be able to seek 
justice under existing law that the Congress finally acted. As this Note later 
demonstrates, however, the version of JASTA that was ultimately passed is a stark 
departure from the original bill introduced in the 114th Congress and will prove to 
be largely ineffective at addressing its stated goals.78 For now, we will simply look at 
how the legislation evolved. 
On September 16, 2015, the original JASTA bill was introduced in the 
Senate.79 That bill would later pass out of the Senate Judiciary Committee as an 
amendment in the nature of a substitution.80 This was the first version of JASTA 
debated by the full Senate, and it received a lot of attention because of its potential 
implications for sovereign immunity and United States foreign relations.81 There 
were four main parts to this bill that would have amended the FSIA and the ATA. 
First, this bill would have reversed the recent judicial decision which held that the 
FSIA tort exception only applied to tortious conduct occurring entirely within the 
territorial United States.82 Second, it would have introduced clarifying language in 
77 See, e.g., Letter from Ash Carter, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., to William Thornberry, Chairman, 
Comm. on Armed Servs., U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://static.politico.com/07/ab/a362dde34184add8a98ea6bd7ce7/carter-9-11-bill-
letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/84Y3-D23R] (“While we are sympathetic to the intent of JASTA, its 
potential second- and third-order consequences could be devastating to the Department and its Service 
members and could undermine our important counterterrorism efforts abroad.”); see also Open Letter 
from William Cohen, former Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., et al., to the President of the United States and 
Members of Congress (undated), 
https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/letter_obama_congress_jasta.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPW4-
P3K2].  
78 See infra Part IV. 
79 161 CONG. REC. S6699 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2015) (Introduction of Bills and Joint Resolutions). 
80 162 CONG. REC. S575 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2016) (Reports of Committees); see also Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 
2016). 
81 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 9/11 Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-
warns-of-economic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/ZPS4-
4BYF]. 
82 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. § 3 (as reported by  
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016) (amending the FSIA tort exception in  
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) to apply “regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission occurs”); see 
also supra Section II.B. 
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the ATA to make it applicable in secondary liability cases which arise out of acts of 
international terrorism.83 Third, the bill would have allowed personal jurisdiction 
“to the maximum extent permissible under the 5th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States” for acts of international terrorism which create a 
cause of action under the ATA.84 And finally, it would have removed the 
prohibition under the ATA for bringing suits against foreign states and their 
officers and employees acting within their official capacity.85 
The version of JASTA which passed out of committee was hotly contested and 
received a torrent of criticism for its sweeping abolitions of sovereign immunity 
principles.86 But, when the Senate took up the bill for a floor vote, it was not the 
original version that would be voted on, but another amendment in the form of a 
substitution offered by Senator John Cornyn, one of the bill’s chief sponsors.87  
This bill, which was the version that would eventually be voted into law, included a 
number of changes that essentially destroyed the brunt of the force behind JASTA. 
Because these changes are explicated in further detail later in the Note, only a quick 
summary of the changes are provided in this section. Although the final version of 
JASTA allowed terrorism litigation against states that were not sponsors of 
terrorism, it limited the ability to bring such suits in other ways and created a 
provision allowing the United States government to stay any case brought under 
JASTA in perpetuity.88 Essentially, the version of JASTA that was signed into law 
symbolized an erosion of sovereign immunity with all of the foreign policy and 
national security concerns that come with such an act; but, it lacked any teeth that 
would allow it to accomplish its stated purpose.89 
 
C.  Arguments in Support of and Against JASTA and Concerns of Unintended 
Consequences 
 
“I am going to support the veto override, but it is not without concern for the 
potential unintended consequences. . . . [T]he risk of shielding the perpetrators of 
terrorism from justice outweighs the risks on how other countries might respond to 
83 S. 2040 § 4 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to allow aiding and abetting liability in actions for 
injury that arise from “an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an 
organization that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization”); see also supra Section II.C. 
84 S. 2040 § 5. Effectively, this section was designed to overrule recent circuit court decisions which 
had held that families of 9/11 victims lacked personal jurisdiction over certain Saudi defendants. See, 
e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659,  
679–82 (2d Cir. 2013). 
85 S. 2040 § 6; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2012). 
86 See, e.g., Mazetti, supra note 81. 
87 114 CONG. REC. S2846–48 (daily ed. May 17, 2016). 
88 Compare Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016), with Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 
114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016). 
89 See infra Part IV. 
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and perhaps compromise U.S. interests.”90 Even before the veto override votes had 
been counted, members of Congress from both parties were speaking out about the 
“unintended consequences” of the legislation they were about to pass.91 This section 
examines various arguments against the passage of JASTA and the counter-
arguments in favor. 
 
i.  JASTA Places Strategic Foreign Policy Decisions in the Hands of the Courts 
Rather Than National Security Experts 
 
As President Obama argued in his veto message to Congress, JASTA removes 
responsibility for handling terrorist activities from the hands of foreign policy and 
national security professionals and places it in the hands of private litigants and the 
courts.92 Foreign policy considerations, including the United States response to 
terrorism, are largely the responsibility of the executive branch with input from 
Congress. These decisions usually require quick and decisive action of the kind the 
President is more adept at performing. It is for this reason that the State 
Department, intelligence agencies, and the National Security Council are all 
organized under the executive, with legislators providing key oversight.93 The 
President, with input from his national security team, already has the power to 
label a foreign government a State Sponsor of Terrorism; such a designation brings 
with it a litany of effective United States responses, including a partial stripping of 
sovereign immunity.94 
In contrast to the careful and thoughtful decision—with input from a myriad of 
national security, foreign policy, and intelligence  
professionals—to designate a foreign government as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 
JASTA allows any foreign sovereign to be stripped of its sovereign immunity based 
solely on the accusations of a litigant in a United States court.95 This can invite 
consequential decisions on incomplete or inaccurate information, which may in fact 
run counter to United States foreign policy objectives.  
Consider, for example, a recent case that involved private litigants attempting to 
collect a judgment against the Palestinian National Authority (“PNA”) in a United 
States court. The litigants had obtained a judgment against the PNA and the 
90 162 CONG. REC. S6169 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016) (statement by Sen. Cardin on voting to 
override President Obama’s veto). 
91 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
92  Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040, supra note 69. 
93 As argued by former U.N. Ambassador, John Bolton, and former U.S. Attorney General, 
General Michael Mukasey, “J[ASTA] shifts authority for a huge component of national security from 
the politically accountable branches—the president and Congress—to the judiciary, the branch least 
competent to deal with international matters of life and death and least politically accountable.” John R. 
Bolton & Michael B. Mukasey, The Folly of Fighting Terrorism by Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.  
(Sept. 5, 2016, 6:54 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/the-folly-of-fighting-terrorism-by-lawsuit-
1473116091 [https://perma.cc/UCK6-XR6D]. 
94 Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040, supra note 69. 
95 See id.  
                                                       KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                    Vol. I06 160
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under the ATA, which—because of 
the treble damages clause in that  
statute—totaled $655.5 million.96 The problem, the United States government 
provides hundreds of millions of dollars a year to support the PNA, largely as an 
effort to promote stability in the region and deter other terrorist groups.97 When 
the litigants moved to satisfy their judgment by requiring the PNA to post a bond, 
the United States government filed a declaration with the court to persuade them 
to waive or reduce the bond.98 
In response to concerns over JASTA’s effect on the executive branch’s ability to 
alleviate national security issues, the supporters of JASTA argued that President 
Obama’s veto constituted a shift in his administration’s previous views on allowing 
victims of terrorist attacks to seek justice in United States courts.99 In support of 
this proposition they point to the same declaration submitted in the PNA case 
discussed above. Rather than looking to the underlying case and the foreign policy 
implications that have arisen from the litigation, they observe that the Deputy 
Secretary of State insists that “[i]mposing civil liability on those who commit or 
sponsor acts of terrorism is an important means of deterring and defeating terrorist 
activity.”100 Regardless of the utopian ideals for countering terrorism that Deputy 
Secretary Blinken discusses, the PNA case and the declaration itself actually 
present the unintended consequences that can arise from such private litigation. 
 
96 Jennifer Peltz & Tom Hays, U.S. Jury: Palestinian Authorities to Blame for Terror Attacks, 
MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:31 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/article11014829.html [https://perma.cc/LGM6-9LEP]. 
97 See generally JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22967, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO THE 
PALESTINIANS (2016) (discussing U.S. assistance to Palestinians).  
98 U.S. Government Intervenes in Lawsuit Payments over Palestinian Terror Attacks, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 11, 2015, 6:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/11/palestine-obama-
administration-terror-attack-lawsuit-payments [https://perma.cc/43FX-F8XT]. Deputy Secretary of 
State Blinken makes the case that the U.S. “strongly supports the rights of victims of terrorism to 
vindicate their interests in federal court and to receive just compensation for their injuries.” Brief for 
Respondent at Appendix 4a–5a, Declaration of Anthony J. Blinken, Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation 
Org., Civil Action No. 1:04-cv-00397-GBD-RLE (May 23, 2017) (No.16–1071). Supporters of 
JASTA point to this as an indication that the U.S. believes civil liability is an effective tool to be used in 
deterring and defeating terrorism around the globe, but the underlying case proves this mechanism can 
often run counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives. See id. at 4a–6a. In an ironic twist, one of the first 
cases brought under the newly passed JASTA was not against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but rather 
against Israel, one of America’s strongest Middle Eastern allies. Joshua Claybourn, How Congress 
Made it Easier to Sue Israel, HILL (Feb. 6, 2017, 2:12 PM), http://origin-
nyi.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/318097-how-congress-made-it-easier-to-sue-
israel [https://perma.cc/9MUM-65NW]. This illustrates the reality that JASTA will lead to results 
antithetical to U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
99 Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, PASSJASTA.ORG (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://passjasta.org/2016/09/response-message-president-accompanying-veto-justice-sponsors-
terrorism-act/ [https://perma.cc/56HB-BZ4L].  
100 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 98, at 6a. 
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ii.  The Erosion of Sovereign Immunity Leaves the United States Vulnerable to 
Reciprocal Treatment by Other Countries 
 
Sovereign immunity has served as a bedrock principle of international relations 
for hundreds of years.101 As President Obama argued in his veto message, JASTA 
disrupts this foundational principle and, if applied globally, will have disastrous 
implications for United States national interests.102 Reciprocity is a key tenant of 
foreign relations; indeed, other countries already have laws in place that allow tit-
for-tat erosions of sovereign immunity, and such laws are in conformity with 
international practices.103 Past experiences have shown, when Congress passes 
legislation that makes it easier for private litigants to sue foreign sovereigns in 
United States courts, no matter how targeted or narrow the legislation is, we can 
expect to face reciprocal treatment from other countries.104 
In response to this concern, supporters of JASTA noted that the final version of 
the bill that passed through Congress was the result of careful consideration, and 
amendments were designed specifically to ameliorate any concerns of reciprocity.105 
Specifically, amendments were made to allow the United States government to stay 
a lawsuit “if the State Department verifie[d] the administration [was] engaged in 
good faith discussions” to resolve the dispute.106 Additionally, the law was amended 
to require a defendant to establish that the foreign government acted with more 
than mere negligence; that it acted recklessly or intentionally.107 Supporters argued 
101 GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 9–19 
(1984). There has been some discussion as to whether sovereign immunity is enshrined in international 
law and therefore whether JASTA is in violation of such laws. See, e.g., William Dodge, Does JASTA 
Violate International Law?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 30, 2016, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/33325/jasta-violate-international-law-2/ [https://perma.cc/8NHW-
SDRS]. This Note does not seek to address whether JASTA violates international law, but rather 
asserts that it cuts against traditional principles of international relations. It is certainly far from clear if 
international law is breached through this act, but, arguably, it is abundantly clear that, at the very least, 
JASTA violates international comity, which often forms the basis for reciprocal action. See id. 
102 Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040, supra note 69 (“The United States 
has a larger international presence, by far, than any other country, and sovereign immunity principles 
protect our Nation and its Armed Forces, officials, and assistance professionals, from foreign court 
proceedings.”). 
103 For example, Russia and Iran both have reciprocity laws designed to “deter the lifting of [their] 
sovereign immunity” by other countries, and Cuba and Iran have laws specifically targeting U.S. 
sovereign immunity. Peter Roudik, Glob. Legal Research Ctr., Law Library of Cong., Comparative 
Summary, in LAWS LIFTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 1 (2016), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sovereign-immunity/lifting-sovereign-immunity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6UHS-APK2]. 
104 See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
105 See Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, supra note 99.  
106 Jordain Carney, GOP Leaders Express Reservations a Day After 9/11 Veto Override, HILL 
(Sept. 29, 2016, 2:29 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/298530-gop-leaders-open-to-
fixing-saudi-9-11-bill [https://perma.cc/ZX7X-3Z7V]; see also Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 5(c), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016). 
107 Carney, supra note 106; see also Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 3(d). 
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that the passage of JASTA by wide vote margins and with bipartisan support, after 
these amendments, demonstrated Congress’s view that the revisions had addressed 
any legitimate concerns and that JASTA was good policy.108 
The 9/11 Committee, a group of 9/11 families and JASTA supporters, 
expressed the view that JASTA was narrowly tailored and applied only to acts of 
international terrorism caused by “a foreign state.”109 This caveat, the group 
concluded, makes the law inapplicable to military activities and actions by 
individual foreign agents.110 Because of the law’s narrow application, the 
Committee argues that there is no legitimate threat of reciprocal statutes being 
enacted against the United States.111 Instead, the group believes President Obama’s 
real concern is not grounded in the international law concept of reciprocity, but 
rather the fear that other nations will engage in “acts of provocation and 
aggression” toward the United States government’s legitimate overseas actions.112 
The Committee argues the proper way to address such concerns is not through a 
veto of JASTA, but rather by making clear to foreign nations that the United 
States will respond to acts of aggression using its “full range of diplomatic, 
economic, social, and military” tools.113 
While supporters of JASTA may be correct to assume that much of the 
international response to JASTA will be grounded in provocation rather than true 
reciprocity, this legislation at least gives foreign states the opportunity to claim 
reciprocity in an international forum. American financial and material support can 
be traced to behavior across the globe that may be deemed terroristic activity by 
other countries—for example, Middle Eastern countries may view United States 
aid to Israel as terroristic when it results in displacements or killings in the West 
Bank; other countries may seek to hold the U.S. accountable for the alleged civilian 
attacks perpetrated by United States-backed Syrian rebels; and American airstrikes 
that cause civilian deaths, even those targeted at Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, 
may be viewed as a form of terrorism.114 The threat of true reciprocal action may be 
remote, but that will not stop our adversaries from seizing on this legislation as an 
opportunity to respond in kind. The breadth of United States involvement around 
108 See Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, supra note 99.  
109 Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, supra note 99; see also Message from 9/11 Committee, supra note 4. 
110 See Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, supra note 99.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 For example, it was reported that Syria sought to take legal action against the United States in 
connection with the death of Syrian nationals in Lebanon who Syria claimed died as a result of 
bombings carried out by the Israeli Air Force with U.S.-supplied weaponry. See George Sadek, Glob. 
Legal Research Ctr., Law Library of Cong., Syria, in LAWS LIFTING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 16 (2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sovereign-immunity/lifting-
sovereign-immunity.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UHS-APK2]; see also Claybourn, supra note 98.  
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the world leaves us particularly vulnerable to such attacks and means that we have 
the most to lose from even the slightest threat of reciprocity, no matter what the 
true motivations may be. 
 
iii.  Foreign Litigation Would Involve an Intrusive Discovery Process and the Risk 
of Extreme Monetary Damages 
 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter expressed concerns about the “intrusive discovery 
process” that would result from mere accusations by foreign actors that the United 
States provided support for terrorist activities.115 Coupled with this concern, 
Secretary Carter outlined the potential that litigants may request sensitive 
government information during the discovery process.116 Exposure to foreign 
litigation may place the United States in the ill-fated position of choosing whether 
to protect classified information or suffer an adverse ruling in a foreign court.117 An 
adverse ruling would also create a sizeable risk of extreme money damages being 
assessed against the United States and numerous overseas assets potentially being at 
risk of seizure to satisfy any judgment.118 Having to defend and strategize against 
foreign litigation would divert valuable resources from crucial foreign policy and 
national security initiatives. 
 
iv.  JASTA Will Complicate Delicate Relationships with Key Allies 
 
One argument, which may be of little concern to the families who lost their 
loved ones on September 11, 2001, is that JASTA will interfere in our relationships 
with foreign partners. President Obama claimed that JASTA will further 
complicate relationships with key allies and undermine trust and cooperation 
between the United States and valuable overseas partners who work with the 
United States on counterterrorism and national security issues across the globe.119 
This concern was also shared by Secretary Carter and a coalition of former national 
security and foreign policy professionals.120 
While this concern may be easily dismissed by families seeking justice for their 
loved ones, the reality is that the United States relies heavily on global allies and the 
support of Middle Eastern nations to protect against violent extremism and acts of 
terrorism directed against the United States and our allies. While JASTA was 
being debated in the Senate, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was privately 
warning United States lawmakers that “JASTA would also have a chilling effect on 
115 See Letter from Ash Carter to William Thornberry, supra note 77.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040, supra note 69.  
120 See Letter from Ash Carter to William Thornberry, supra note 77. 
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the global fight against terrorism.”121 The UAE, and other allies, warned that they 
may be forced to curtail the breadth of their intelligence sharing with the United 
States if the law were to pass:122 “If a foreign sovereign nation is at risk of being 
sued in a US court, even if it’s an ally, that nation will be less likely to share crucial 
information and intelligence under [JASTA].”123 
The United States must be able to maintain delicate and complex relationships 
with its Middle East allies in order to continue to fight against future acts of 
terrorism. Even if this concern rings hollow to the 9/11 families, it is a real and 
legitimate concern for future United States counterterrorism strategies. 
 
IV.  THIS VERSION OF JASTA WILL FAIL TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IT SEEKS 
TO ADDRESS 
 
Reasonable people can disagree about whether a terrorism exception to 
sovereign immunity is the best way to seek justice for the 9/11 families; what is 
clear though, is that the JASTA bill enacted into law, carries substantial costs and 
provides virtually no benefits to 9/11 victims and their families. The original 
JASTA bill that passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee would have waived 
immunity for foreign sovereigns and allowed suit when the tortious acts took place 
overseas and against those who merely aided and abetted acts of terrorism.124 By 
contrast, the version of JASTA that passed through Congress provides significant 
and likely insurmountable hurdles for the families seeking justice, but it still 
represents a symbolic waiver of sovereign immunity that will likely be met with 
reciprocal action overseas. 
The version of JASTA first passed out of Committee was specifically tailored to 
override previous court decisions that had created impediments to the 9/11 families 
seeking to bring lawsuits against the Saudis. First, it provided an express grant of 
personal jurisdiction in terrorism cases; by contrast, the final version of JASTA 
provides no such grant.125 Second, the original JASTA would have amended the 
FSIA exception for tortious conduct to allow suit where the conduct occurred 
outside of the territorial United States.126 The final version of JASTA did not 
include this amendment.127  
The first version of JASTA also contained a provision that removed the general 
prohibition on suing foreign sovereigns under the ATA.128 Under the final JASTA 
121 Edward Malnick & Luke Heighton, UAE Warned US It Could End Intelligence Cooperation 
over 9/11 Victims Claims, TELEGRAPH (June 21, 2017, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/21/uae-warned-us-could-end-intelligence-cooperation-911-
victims/ [https://perma.cc/6YWL-C2J6]. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See supra Section III.B. 
125 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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law, this amendment was drastically narrowed. As enacted, JASTA, like the ATA, 
prohibits claims against “a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer 
or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or her official 
capacity.”129 In fact, the law appears to purposefully exclude foreign sovereigns from 
liability under an aiding and abetting theory.130 That said, JASTA does allow suit 
against foreign sovereigns in limited circumstances. JASTA suits are permissible:  
 
[I]n any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state 
for physical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United 
States and caused by—(1) an act of international terrorism in the United 
States; and (2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, 
employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of 
his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless where the tortious 
act or acts of the foreign state occurred.131  
 
As discussed above, however, claims against foreign sovereigns cannot be based 
on an aiding and abetting theory of liability.132 Thus, JASTA suits may still only be 
based on primary liability, which has already been a significant barrier to 9/11 
litigation. 
One of the most significant differences between previous versions of JASTA 
and the bill that was finally passed comes from Section Five. This new section 
creates a procedure under which the United States government can stay any case 
under JASTA, potentially indefinitely, if the United States government certifies 
that it is “engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant 
concerning the resolution of the claims.”133 The district court appears to have 
discretion on whether to grant the initial stay, but after the first stay is granted, the 
law requires the court to extend the stay as long as the government continues to 
129 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (2012). 
130 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 4(a), 130 Stat. 852, 854 
(2016). The Act provides that aiding and abetting liability may be asserted against any person. Id. It 
further provides “the term ‘person’ has the meaning given the term in section 1 of title 1.” Id. In that 
section, person is defined to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). This definition appears 
to exclude foreign sovereigns; thus, a plain reading of the amended statute under JASTA would offer no 
aiding and abetting liability against foreign sovereigns. Because no one is claiming the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia actually perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, any theory of liability would be based on a secondary 
liability such as aiding and abetting. 
131 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 3.  
132 See supra note 88, 130 and accompanying text.  
133 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 5. This new section gives the U.S. Attorney 
General the ability to intervene in any case brought under JASTA. Id. Once they have intervened, the 
U.S. government may petition the court to stay any proceeding “if the Secretary of State certifies that 
the United States is engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant concerning the 
resolution of the claims against the foreign state.” Id. Once a court decides to stay a proceeding under 
any such certification, they must extend the stay as long as the U.S. “remains engaged in good faith 
discussions with the foreign state defendant.” Id. 
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certify it is in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant.134 Of course, 
the district court may deny the initial stay, but past precedent shows federal judges’ 
willingness to find ways to avoid reaching the merits of these suits, and it seems 
unlikely that a court would be willing to allow a suit to proceed when the law gives 
them the ability to stop it.135 This stay provision alone will likely end future 
attempts to sue foreign sovereigns for terrorism activity, before such suits can even 
get off the ground. 
In addition to the provisions discussed above, the new JASTA also makes it 
harder to prosecute any case if that case could have been brought in an independent 
manner. A new amendment to the FSIA under JASTA requires a judge to “stay 
any request, demand, or order for discovery on the United States” when the 
Attorney General certifies that it would “significantly interfere with . . . a national 
security operation.”136 While this only allows the judge to stay discovery requests on 
the United States, any claim would not be able to advance as long as this stay 
remains in place. Just as the stay created under Section Five of JASTA, this stay 
may potentially be imposed indefinitely, creating yet another barrier to meaningful 
terrorism litigation under JASTA. 
Finally, if a private plaintiff somehow managed to obtain a judgment under 
JASTA ⎯ surmounting all the legal hurdles placed in the plaintiff’s way ⎯ the 
plaintiff would face even more obstacles when he or she sought to enforce the 
judgment. The original JASTA bill was written to modify existing FSIA 
exceptions, but the final JASTA created a separate FSIA exception.137 Why does 
this matter? The FSIA has a separate provision concerning whether a foreign state’s 
property is immune from attachment following a judgment.138 That is to say, even 
if a claim is permitted under the FSIA, the property also must be excluded from 
attachment immunity under the FSIA in order to use it to satisfy a judgment. The 
existing exceptions in the FSIA, to which the original JASTA applied, are exempt 
from attachment immunity.139 Thus, if a judgment was obtained under one of those 
exceptions, the foreign state’s property would be subject to attachment.140 
134 Id. 
135 See supra Section II.B. 
136 28 U.S.C. § 1605(g)(1) (2012 & Supp. III 2016); see also Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act § 3(b)(2) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1605(g)(1) to apply to the new JASTA claims that may be 
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1605B).  
137 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s version of JASTA modified existing exceptions under the 
FSIA. By contrast, the JASTA bill that passed through Congress created a new exception under  
28 U.S.C. § 1605B. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
138 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; 28 U.S.C. § 1610. 
140 Even with this exemption provision, it has been notoriously difficult to collect judgments against 
foreign states. But, one potential unintended benefit of the recent Iran nuclear deal is that it may make 
it easier to collect on previous judgments rendered against Iran under provisions of the ATA and FSIA 
(Iran is a designated state sponsor of terrorism, thus the FSIA exception that has been in place since 
1996 allows for suits against Iran). Charlie Savage, Iran Nuclear Deal Could Be Gateway for Terrorism 
Legal Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/terrorism-
foreign-governments-lawsuits-iran-nuclear-deal.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/6FX5-CDBB]. 
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Conversely, there is no corresponding attachment immunity exclusion in the new 
JASTA;141 therefore, any judgment obtained under the new JASTA section of the 
FSIA would not exempt the foreign state’s property from attachment. Whether 
this was simply a congressional oversight or an intended obstruction is not clear. 
Either way, it provides another significant barrier to terrorism litigation. 
To reiterate, while it was entirely reasonable for people to disagree over whether 
the benefits of the original JASTA outweighed its likely costs, the final version of 
JASTA leaves no room for reasonable disagreement. By passing a bill that 
symbolically strips sovereign immunity from any nation that may be accused of 
international terrorism, and at the same time creates significant and overwhelming 
obstacles to potential litigation, Congress has left the 9/11 families with no 
practical means for seeking justice and put our country at risk for reciprocal 
treatment from other nations. JASTA is “thus the worst of all worlds.”142 
 
V.  NAVIGATING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN A POST-JASTA WORLD 
 
A.  Opportunities to Amend JASTA and Mitigate any Unintended Consequences 
 
Only two days after Congress voted to override President Obama’s veto and to 
enact JASTA into law, Stephanie DeSimone, whose husband was killed at the 
Pentagon on September 11, was the first to file suit.143 The Saudi government 
responded, noting that “JASTA is of great concern to the community of nations 
that object to the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity, which has 
governed international relations for hundreds of years. The erosion of sovereign 
immunity will have a negative impact on all nations, including the United 
Following the Iran nuclear deal, a group of terrorism victims who successfully won a judgment against 
Iran have gone to a European court to try to enforce it; the court has put a freeze on $1.6 billion in 
Iranian assets pending the outcome of the hearing. Id. While some have argued that this type of action 
“violate[s] the spirit” of the nuclear deal, it perfectly illustrates the difficulty terrorism victims have 
encountered in trying to collect their judgments, even when they were given an exception to attachment 
immunity. Id.  
141 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1610. 
142 Jack Goldsmith & Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Obama Should Veto 9/11 Families Bill, CNN 
(Sept. 13, 2016, 4:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/opinions/obama-9-11-families-bill-
goldsmith-vladeck/index.html [https://perma.cc/64KU-YKBN]. 
143 Greg Clary, 9/11 Widow Files Lawsuit Against Saudi Arabia, CNN (Oct. 1, 2016, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/01/politics/saudi-arabia-9-11-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7HTY-ZS8H]. 
More than 800 people, including those injured on 9/11 and the families of those killed, have also filed a 
lawsuit against Saudi Arabia after the passage of JASTA. Claudia Koerner, Hundreds of 9/11 Victims 
and Their Family Members Are Suing Saudi Arabia, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:41 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/claudiakoerner/911-victims-sue-saudi-
arabia?utm_term=.pewQrOY1kZ#.hl06kB3vDb [https://perma.cc/ESY2-JKTH]. In addition, 
insurance companies and others are lining up to sue the Saudis for billions in damages as a result of their 
alleged involvement in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Jonathan Stempel, Insurers, Victims Sue 
Saudi Arabia over Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks, INS. J. (Mar. 27, 2017), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/03/27/445679.htm [https://perma.cc/K77M-
TSA8]. 
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States.”144 But, Saudi Arabia is not alone in its condemnation of the new law. The 
European Union Delegation to the United States has filed a formal complaint with 
the State Department regarding JASTA.145 In it, they argue that the 
“implementation of the JASTA would be in conflict with fundamental principles of 
international law and in particular the principle of State sovereign immunity.”146 
Thus, even before JASTA has been fully implemented, threats of negative 
consequences are being expressed by other countries.147 Congress has a duty to act 
now, before other nations enact reciprocal laws. 
Some have argued that fixing JASTA may be as simple as passing an 
amendment that grants the President authority to waive the new terrorism 
exception to the FSIA with respect to certain countries.148 After all, there is 
precedent for such a move. In 2008, during the Bush Administration, Congress 
passed legislation that amended the FSIA but allowed the President to waive the 
exception that would have granted plaintiffs the ability to sue Iraq for terrorist acts 
committed under the Saddam Hussein regime.149 Similarly, in 1996 Congress 
passed legislation that would allow individuals to sue Cuba for trafficking in seized 
property, but included a waiver provision that has been used by every president 
since its enactment.150 But, given President Trump’s previous comment calling 
President Obama’s veto of JASTA a “disgrace,”151 it seems unlikely that he would 
sign such an amendment or authorize such a waiver even if available. 
Additionally, Congress could pass an amendment that narrows the application 
of JASTA to only apply to the attacks of September 11. This option would provide 
the families of 9/11 victims the opportunity to file suit while also minimizing any 
attempts at reciprocity. It can be argued that the attacks of September 11 are 
144 Clary, supra note 143 (emphasis added). 
145 Letter from the EU Delegation to the U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp-content/uploads/sites/47/2016/09/EU-on-
JASTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6TT-ZJWA] (referring to the adoption of the Justice Against Sponsors 
of Terrorism Act).  
146 Id. The EU Delegation goes on to argue, “State immunity is a central pillar of international legal 
order. Any derogation from the principle of immunity bears the inherent danger of causing reciprocal 
action by other states and an erosion of the principle as such. The latter would put a burden on bilateral 
relations between states as well as on the international order as a whole.” Id. 
147 Saudi Arabia Condemns Passage of US 9/11 Law, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/saudi-arabia-condemns-passage-911-law-
160930042131171.html [https://perma.cc/4L7F-FP85]. 
148 John Bellinger, How Congress Could Fix JASTA: Give the President Waiver Authority, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2016, 8:40 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-congress-could-fix-jasta-give-
president-waiver-authority [https://perma.cc/JP97-EMUC]. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.; see also Mimi Whitefield, Trump to Suspend Lawsuit Provision of Helms-Burton Act in 
August, MIAMI HERALD (July 17, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/cuba/article161810183.html [https://perma.cc/H3R9-X9DD] (noting President 
Trump's decision to use the waiver provision).  
151 Mark Hensch, Trump Slams Obama for ‘Shameful’ 9/11 Bill Veto, HILL (Sept. 23, 2016, 6:18 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297558-trump-rips-obama-for-shameful-
9-11-veto [https://perma.cc/E8R2-K8J9]. 
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unique and passage of such a targeted amendment would make it difficult for 
foreign governments to legitimately argue for reciprocity. As currently drafted, 
JASTA does not have such a limited scope, but rather applies to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 and any terrorist attacks that occur after.152  
Another option would be to limit JASTA’s effects on sovereign immunity by 
applying the statute solely to Saudi Arabia. In contrast to JASTA’s broad exception 
to sovereign immunity, which could form the basis of a reciprocal act by any 
country, a narrower application would limit potential adverse effects.153 
Furthermore, “[s]uch a targeted approach would be [more] consistent with what 
Congress” has previously done, such as when it enacted a terrorism exception to 
sovereign immunity that targeted state sponsors of terrorism.154 Although Saudi 
Arabia is not currently on the state sponsors of terrorism list —and likely will not 
be placed on it—Congress could go around the executive branch in this limited 
case to statutorily allow terrorism suits against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.155 
Ultimately, this option would also require Congress to acknowledge the true target 
of this legislation; Congressional leaders may not want to make themselves more 
accountable for any negative consequences to United States-Saudi relations.156 
Some have argued that limiting the legislation to Saudi Arabia alone may not 
solve the problem.157 They suggest that instead of using JASTA to “create a new 
terrorism exception to the FSIA,” as it currently does, JASTA should amend the 
current FSIA tort exception to allow suit where the action occurs outside of the 
United States.158 Those in favor of this revision note its many advantages: a tort 
exception to sovereign immunity is common in international relations, and, 
although the United States interprets its exception to require the “entire tort” to 
occur within the United States, this does not appear to be the prevailing 
international consensus.159 Additionally, the tort exception has a specific exclusion 
for military activities during armed conflicts, which would limit reciprocal laws 
from applying to United States military action.160 
152 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 7, 130 Stat. 852, 855 
(2016). 
153 See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, How to Limit JASTA’s Adverse Impact, LAWFARE 
(June 3, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-limit-jastas-adverse-impact 
[https://perma.cc/4XRH-5WWL]. 
154 See id. 
155 See State Sponsors of Terrorism, supra note 33. 
156 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 153. 
157 See, e.g., William Dodge, JASTA and Reciprocity, JUST SECURITY (June 9, 2016, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/31445/jasta-reciprocity/ [https://perma.cc/V5XK-UTWB]. 
158 Id. This was a part of the version of JASTA which passed out of committee but was not in the 
final JASTA bill passed through Congress. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 
114th Cong. § 3 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016). 
159 Dodge, supra note 157. 
160 See id. The International Court of Justice has ruled that international law requires a territorial 
tort exception to sovereign immunity. The practical effect is to create an exemption for torts caused by a 
State’s armed forces “in the course of conducting an armed conflict.” Id.; see also Jurisdictional 
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Yet another proposed tweak is to allow JASTA suits only where a foreign 
sovereign “knowingly engage[d] with a terrorist organization” to carry out an act of 
terror.161 This would significantly limit the scope of JASTA and create an 
additional legal obstacle before suit is allowed. While some may argue this 
amendment would only further weaken the effectiveness of JASTA while 
maintaining its risk for international reciprocity, the limitation would assuage some 
fear among the United States’ allies that they may become targets of a JASTA suit. 
Indeed, there is even some evidence that this change would go a long way in 
curbing the anxiety many key Middle Eastern allies felt after the passage of 
JASTA.162 
The author does not profess to have created an exhaustive list of potential 
solutions for JASTA legislation, but there is clearly no shortage of options or ideas. 
Congress must act swiftly to resolve concerns of other nations⎯particularly the 
concern of United States allies and partners in fighting terrorism overseas. The 
JASTA legislation as enacted is wholly inadequate and must be limited to curb any 
potential for unintended consequences. However, even if changes are made to this 
particular legislation to limit any negative effects, Congress must do more to 
prevent the assault on principles of sovereign immunity. 
 
B.  Congress Has a Duty to Stop the Erosion of Sovereign Immunity When It 
Does Not Benefit United States National Security Interests 
 
Fixing the problems with JASTA will not be enough. The principles of 
sovereign immunity must continue to exist to protect the interests of the United 
States as it conducts extensive global operations. Only a few days after the passage 
of JASTA, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced another piece of legislation 
aimed at eroding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.163 Senator Grassley’s new 
bill, which would remove immunity for foreign state-owned companies,164 must be 
given careful scrutiny by Congress that was lacking in its initial assessments of 
JASTA. “Congress should be very cautious about amending legislation, especially 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, to help plaintiffs’ lawyers when they have 
lost in court.”165 
Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 78 (Feb. 3), http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/143/143-20120203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/98X4-6QHT]. 
161 Cameron Joseph, Pols Push ‘Fix’ to Law Allowing 9/11 Families to Sue Saudi Arabia, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016, 7:39 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/pols-push-fix-
law-allowing-9-11-families-sue-saudi-arabia-article-1.2893546 [https://perma.cc/F36S-NY49]. 
162 See Malnick & Heighton, supra note 121. 
163 John Bellinger, More Threats to Sovereign Immunity? New Bill Would Strip State-Owned 
Companies of Immunity, LAWFARE (Sept. 23, 2016, 11:12 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-
threats-sovereign-immunity-new-bill-would-strip-state-owned-companies-immunity 
[https://perma.cc/M4BM-EQQE]. 
164 Id. 
165 Patrick Gregory, Grassley Considers FSIA Fix, Cites China National Drywall Suit,  
84 U.S.L.W. 48 (June 23, 2016). 
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The United States has even more incentive for upholding principles of 
sovereign immunity when looking at recent actions by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which, for the first time, appears ready to open an investigation into 
alleged crimes committed by United States personnel abroad.166 Specifically, the 
ICC is “preparing to launch” an investigation into United States detention 
practices in Afghanistan and potentially at “black sites” established in Poland, 
Lithuania, and Romania.167 The ICC appears interested in CIA and Department 
of Defense activity and whether there was a high-level United States torture 
policy.168 How does this relate to sovereign immunity? The United States has never 
joined the 1998 treaty that created the ICC⎯the Rome Statute.169 Because the 
United States has not participated in the Rome Statute, it has maintained that the 
ICC lacks jurisdiction over it.170 Because Afghanistan is a party to the Rome 
Statute and has acquiesced to ICC jurisdiction, however, the ICC claims to have 
“jurisdiction over American conduct in Afghanistan.”171 The legal arguments 
surrounding this issue are beyond the scope of this Note, but, in effect, the ICC is 
attempting to pierce United States sovereign immunity by exercising its 
jurisdiction. When the United States is engaged in activities that weaken 
international principles of sovereign immunity, it weakens its own arguments about 
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity in foreign courts, like the ICC. It is in 
America’s self-interest to preserve the principle of sovereign immunity.172 
166 David Bosco, Exclusive: International Criminal Court Poised to Open Investigation into War 
Crimes in Afghanistan, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Oct. 31, 2016, 4:57 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/31/exclusive-international-criminal-court-poised-to-open-
investigation-into-war-crimes-in-afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/6LD8-33UR]. 
167 See id.; David Bosco, US Options for Responding to ICC Scrutiny in Afghanistan, LAWFARE 
(Feb. 23, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/us-options-responding-icc-scrutiny-afghanistan 
[https://perma.cc/594Z-CCZ5]. 
168 See generally Int’l Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor, Rep. on Preliminary 
Examination Activities, at 43–51 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-
PE_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2TF-KBFN] (explaining ICC interest in U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan).  
169 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Subsection of Treaties, 
States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatyS
elected=585#topTable [https://perma.cc/V8FK-R94Z] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Parties 
to Rome Statute] (listing countries that signed the Rome Statute); see also Discussion of Creation of 
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 
Subsection of Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=FA328E3CB5C34944412566900039ACB
B&action=openDocument [https://perma.cc/R4P6-EBUJ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017).  
170 Abraham Joseph, Trump Presidency and International Criminal Justice: Should the World Be 
Ready for a Showdown?, MODERNDIPLOMACY (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=2326:trump-presidency-and-
international-criminal-justice-should-the-world-be-ready-for-a-showdown [https://perma.cc/L84T-
HUCB]. 
171 See Bosco, supra note 167; Parties to Rome Statute, supra note 169.  
172 On November 20, 2017 the chief prosecutor for the ICC formally requested an investigation 
into alleged war crimes committed by the United States military and CIA in Afghanistan. James 
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C.  Other Ways of Bringing Justice to the 9/11 Families 
 
It is a quintessentially American desire to hold those who cause harm 
accountable in a court of law, especially with a tragedy of the magnitude that 
occurred on September 11, 2001. As Terry Strada, the leader of a 9/11 Families  
& Survivors United for Justice Against Terrorism, put it: 
 
[The passage of JASTA] eases the part where you wake up in the 
morning and go to sleep at night and you know that the people that 
killed your husband have completely gotten away with it. And now when 
I wake up, this morning, I said, the people that killed my husband, they 
actually will be held accountable. It’s a very different feeling. It’s a very 
satisfying feeling, and it’s the right thing to do for my children and for 
our country.173  
 
No matter how fulfilling a lawsuit may feel, it is not always the right course of 
action. Particularly in relation to foreign affairs⎯lawsuits brought by individual 
plaintiffs should be considered a last resort for deterring foreign government action. 
Congress should remember the wide array of existing tools it has at its disposal and 
not be so quick to erode international immunity in search of an easy fix. “Sanctions, 
trade embargos, diplomacy, [and] . . . military action” can all be used to protect the 
American people and deter actions by foreign governments.174  
Since the 9/11 attacks, the executive and legislative branches have taken action 
to hold accountable those who committed the horrific attacks of that day and to 
bring some semblance of closure to the families who lost so much. Steps have been 
taken against Al Qaeda, the terrorist group that planned the 9/11 attacks. For 
example, President Obama ordered a raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin 
Laden, the leader of that group.175 Legislation has been passed to cover the health 
benefits for  
first-responders and survivors of 9/11.176 And trials continue to play out in military 
McAuley, ICC Prosecutor Seeks Probe Into War Crimes Allegations Against U.S. Military, CIA in 
Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/icc-
prosecutor-seeks-probe-into-war-crimes-allegations-against-us-military-cia-in-
afghanistan/2017/11/20/e8ec73b8-ce1e-11e7-a87b-47f14b73162a_story.html. This development makes 
it even more imperative for the United States to safeguard the principle of sovereign immunity rather 
than take action to undermine its validity.   
173 Michel Paradis, What’s Driving the Passion Behind JASTA?, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2016,  
9:33 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-driving-passion-behind-jasta [https://perma.cc/4ZFP-
7ELH]. 
174 Evaluating the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2930 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 34, at 36,  
40–41.  
175Macon Phillips, Osama Bin Laden Dead, WHITE HOUSE (May 2, 2011, 12:16 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead 
[https://perma.cc/4UPQ-K49A]. 
176 Frank Thorp V et al., Congress Set to Extend Lifetime Health Care Benefits for 9/11 First 
Responders, NBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 10:53 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
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tribunals against the masterminds behind the September 11 attacks and other 
terrorist attacks against the United States.177 Congress should work to enhance 
these efforts, build on them, and make them more effective, rather than seek to 
violate international principles and allow private litigation. Delegating the 
important task of holding those responsible for 9/11 to private plaintiffs and 
unelected federal courts is a refrainment of congressional responsibility that will do 
significant damage to United States interests abroad. 
Even if litigation appears to be the best course of action, there may be other 
ways to achieve results without a wholesale waiver of sovereign immunity. For 
example, the United States could pressure foreign governments to hold their own 
citizens accountable, “support international criminal tribunals” in their prosecution 
of international terrorism, and fund programs aimed at promoting the 
“international rule of law and victim rehabilitation.”178 This can all be accomplished 
without eroding the internationally recognized tenants of sovereign immunity. 
Briefly, this Note explores two alternatives to seeking justice for the 9/11 families 
that Congress should consider pursuing. This exploration is not meant to be an 
exhaustive list but simply to demonstrate the myriad options Congress has at its 
disposal. 
 
i.  Convince Saudi Arabia to Acquiesce to United States Jurisdiction 
 
It is still far from clear as to whether the Saudis played any role in supporting 
the terrorists who carried out the attacks on 9/11.179 Nevertheless, this Note does 
not seek to litigate the culpability of Saudi Arabia, but rather to determine the most 
effective solution for bringing justice to the victims of terrorism and their families. 
To that end, a more desirable outcome could be reached if the Saudi government 
was persuaded to hold itself accountable or to acquiesce to American jurisdiction.  
The United States has many tools at its disposal to effectuate such cooperation. 
For example, the United States currently provides millions of dollars in tax relief to 
Saudi Arabians by allowing them to conduct investment activities in the United 
news/congress-set-extend-lifetime-healthcare-benefits-9-11-first-responders-n480706 
[https://perma.cc/FT67-5T85]. 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html [https://perma.cc/DY37-953B]. 
178 Evaluating the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2930 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 34, at 41.  
179 See generally 9/11 REVIEW COMM’N, REP. TO DIR. OF THE FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, THE FBI: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 100–07, 117–18 
(2015), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-protecting-the-homeland-in-
the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/P626-9PCX] (discussing the FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 attack); 
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(2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PN3-RGZF]. But 
see Erin Kelly & Ray Locker, Declassified 9/11 Pages Show Ties to Former Saudi Ambassador, USA 
TODAY (July 15, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/07/15/28-
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States through their sovereign wealth fund without tax.180 In fact, recent reports 
suggest that the Saudis actually expect to invest much more in the United States, 
with “plan[s] to grow” their sovereign wealth fund to two trillion dollars.181 
Although not all of this money will be invested in the United States, there is reason 
to believe that much of it will.182 Such a massive increase in United States 
investments by the Saudis would make them eligible for monolithic tax breaks and 
financial savings under current law. 
It would be entirely within the norms of international relations to leverage these 
massive savings the Saudi Arabian government currently receives in order to garner 
their cooperation. Such action would not carry with it the threat of reciprocal 
action. The United States currently provides these tax benefits as a matter of 
statute; thus, they are available to all foreign nations who have sovereign wealth 
funds, regardless of whether the United States receives a reciprocal benefit.183 In 
fact, many countries do not offer the same benefit to the United States.184 
Precedent also exists for singling out Saudi Arabia as ineligible to receive these tax 
benefits if it is not willing to cooperate.185 The threat of such a devastating financial 
blow to the Saudis would likely be enough to at least bring them to the table to 
discuss a joint investigation. 
Although this may not be an option Congress is willing to pursue, it should be 
considered. The leveraging of existing financial benefits received by Saudi Arabia 
does not create the same international concerns that come with an erosion of 
sovereign immunity, and it targets only the country that JASTA was designed to 
180 See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 453–56 
(2009). 
181 See Jonathan Chew, Saudi Arabia Is Creating a Mega-Fund with More than $2 Trillion, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/01/saudi-arabia-fund/ [https://perma.cc/6ZN5-
6NT8]. 
182 While it is “not entirely clear” where these new funds will be invested, Saudi Arabia has 
announced that it plans to increase the portion of the funds that are in “foreign investments to 50% by 
2020, from 5% now.” Stefania Bianchi, The Key Questions Asked About Saudi Arabia’s $2 Trillion 
Fund, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (May 26, 2016, 5:20 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-25/key-questions-raised-by-the-2-trillion-saudi-
wealth-fund-plan [https://perma.cc/CZR9-L5H7]. Saudi Arabia has a history of investing in U.S. 
companies and it is very likely that such investments will continue with an expansion in investment 
capital. See Mike Isaac & Michael J. de la Merced, Uber Turns to Saudi Arabia for $3.5 Billion Cash 
Infusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/technology/uber-
investment-saudi-arabia.html [https://perma.cc/HK55-392C]; Wael Mahdi et al., Saudi Sovereign 
Fund Considers Stake in Six Flags, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2017, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-08/saudi-wealth-fund-pif-said-to-consider-taking-
stake-in-six-flags [https://perma.cc/QG26-EDDA]. 
183 See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign 
Sovereign Tax Exemption, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 987, 1019–20 (2012). 
184 Id. at 1019. 
185 It is not unprecedented for the tax code, where these benefits are housed, to single out countries 
for different treatment. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 999 (2012) (requiring the reporting of boycott requests 
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affect. Such action may further deteriorate the relationship between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia, but that relationship has been weakening for some time.186 
Regardless, the Saudis rely on us to provide military equipment and support in the 
Middle East, and any adverse effects that may result would be superficial and 
unlikely to damage the deeper relationship between our two countries. This is just 
one of many options the United States has to coerce Saudi Arabia into cooperating 
with terrorism investigations—even ones that target the Kingdom directly. 
 
ii.  Enact Fund for Victims of Terrorism 
 
A distinct alternative for seeking justice for the 9/11 families could come in the 
form of a terrorism victims’ fund for those affected by the September 11 attacks. 
Although Congress has already passed legislation to pay for health benefits for the 
survivors of these attacks, they could go even further in creating a fund to 
compensate victims and families for their loss and suffering.187 Such a fund could 
be used to provide money to victims of terrorism while placidly acknowledging the 
potential culpability of foreign states in the 9/11 attacks. This would be a more 
informal setting for seeking justice, which could potentially involve back-channel 
negotiations between the United States and foreign nations such as Saudi Arabia. 
It may be useful to think of this option as a settlement agreement between two 
foreign nations, where one does not formally admit their guilt, but provides a 
mechanism for compensation. The fund may be fronted by the United States 
government, while behind the scenes another State is providing the remuneration. 
This idea is not a radical departure from legislation that Congress has 
previously passed to ensure justice for victims of terrorism. For example, in 2015 
Congress passed a budget bill that created a new “United States Victims of State 
Sponsored Terrorism Fund.”188 This fund was designed to provide compensation 
for the Americans who were held during the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis and for 
other victims of international terrorism who received final court judgments under 
the FSIA exception for state sponsors of terrorism.189 In effect, part of this fund 
186 In the words of former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles Freeman, Jr., “We’ve seen a 
long deterioration in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, and it started well before the Obama Administration. 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is based entirely on interests, not values. It’s been an impossible 
relationship in value terms from the beginning.” Doyle McManus, The  
Saudi-U.S. Relationship: Shakier than Ever, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0110-mcmanus-saudi-us-relationship-20160110-
column.html [https://perma.cc/XX3M-XPKJ]. 
187 See Thorp, et al., supra note 176. 
188 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 404, 129 Stat. 2242, 3007 
(2015). 
189 David M. Herszenhorn, Americans Held Hostage in Iran Win Compensation 36 Years Later, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/25/us/politics/americans-held-
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Compensation, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/americans-held-in-iran-during-444-day-hostage-crisis-finally-get-
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was designed to ease the difficulty of collecting on successful judgments against 
state sponsors of terrorism by creating a pool of money from which successful 
litigants could collect a portion of their judgment.190 However, the portion that was 
intended for the victims of the Iranian Hostage Crisis was designed to overcome 
existing agreements that prohibited those victims from bringing suit against Iran.191 
In the same way, a new 9/11 victims fund could be established to overcome the 
international immunity challenges to holding foreign states accountable for their 
potential involvement in terrorist attacks on United States soil. 
Providing money for these families would certainly not address the deep 
suffering they feel from these attacks, but it could provide some form of meaningful 
justice. Additionally, the burden of enforcement of any judgment against a foreign 
sovereign would be shifted from the 9/11 families to the United States government. 
It is likely that the government would be in a better position to collect monies from 
these foreign actors than any private citizen. Although the compensation would be 
paid initially out of the United States Treasury, the United States could use its full 
array of enforcement techniques to recoup at least a portion of these funds. Because 
this would involve a foreign state, the United States, seeking compensation from 
another foreign state, for example, Saudi Arabia, this would not implicate the 
principles of sovereign immunity. 
This is not a new idea. The British government already provides compensation 
to its citizens who are victims of overseas terrorist attacks.192 Additionally, in 2003, 
the Bush Administration proposed a terrorism victim compensation legislation, but 
the bill did not advance.193 This legislation would have provided compensation to 
victims of the 9/11 attacks equal to the benefits for public safety officers killed in 
compensation/2015/12/24/c1054c2e-aa4b-11e5-bff5-905b92f5f94b_story.html 
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the line of duty.194 Rather than eviscerate internationally recognized principles of 
sovereign immunity, Congress may consider re-examining this legislation and 
enacting a 9/11 victims fund. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While it is hard not to feel sympathy for the families of the victims of 
September 11,  JASTA does not provide them the closure or justice that they need. 
Every time the United States enacts a new piece of legislation that chips away at 
the longstanding doctrine of sovereign immunity, we must be mindful of the 
potential that foreign actors will use our laws as justification to go after our military 
members, diplomats, and intelligence operatives working on legitimate government 
missions abroad. “[G]iven this country’s global use of intelligence agents, Special 
Operations forces and drones, all of which could be construed as state-sponsored 
‘terrorism’ when convenient,” it is not far-fetched to believe other countries could 
turn the precedent set by JASTA against the United States. 195  “[T]errorism is 
often in the eye of the beholder, and reciprocity need not be precise.”196 As Senator 
Cardin (D-MD), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
put it, “While I have faith and confidence in the American legal system, the same 
faith does not necessarily extend to the fairness of legal systems of other countries 
that may claim they are taking similar actions against America when they are 
not.”197 
While it is true, as the Supreme Court has said, that “foreign sovereign 
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not 
a restriction imposed by the Constitution,”198 we must not rescind its protections 
without careful deliberation of the potential ramifications. Congressional leaders 
have a duty to reject further assaults on the international principles of sovereign 
immunity and to work to narrow the scope of JASTA as much as possible to 
minimize its potential for unintended consequences. Justice has been, and will 
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continue to be brought, to the families of 9/11 through actions of the executive and 
legislative branches.199 
199 See Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 628 (Sept. 23, 2016) (describing executive and 
legislative branch efforts to pursue justice against Al Qaeda, “the terrorist group that planned the 9/11 
attacks,” to kill Osama bin Laden, to enact legislation that covers health benefits for first responders and 
survivors of 9/11, and to declassify congressional investigation reports related to 9/11). 
